The Use of an Object

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In this paper I propose to put forward for discussion the idea of the use of an object. The allied subject of relating to objects seems to me to have had our full attention. The idea of the use of an object has not, however, been so much examined, and it may not even have been specifically studied.

This work on the use of an object arises out of my clinical experience and is in the direct line of development that is peculiarly mine. I cannot assume, of course, that the way my ideas have developed has been followed by others, but I would like to point out that there has been a sequence, and the order that there may be in the sequence belongs to the evolution of my work.

My work on transitional objects and phenomena which followed on naturally after 'The Observation of Infants in a Set Situation' (Winnicott, 1941) is fairly well known. Obviously the idea of the use of an object is related to the capacity to play. I have recently given attention to the subject of creative playing (Winnicott, 1968a). This is near to my present subject. Then also there is a natural development from my point of view along the line of the concepts of the holding environment, this facilitating the individual's discovery of the self. Arising out of failure in this area of the facilitating environment can be seen the whole subject of the development of character disorders associated with the setting up of various kinds of false self, these representing failures of self-establishment and self-discovery. All this makes sense, for me, of the special focus that there is in my work on what I have called transitional phenomena and the study of the minute details that are available to the clinician that illustrate the gradual build-up of the individual's capacity to play and the capacity to find and then to use the 'external' world with its own independence and autonomy.

What I have to say in this present paper is extremely simple. Although it comes out of my psychoanalytical experience I would not say that it could have come out of my psychoanalytical experience of two decades ago, because I would not then have had the technique to make possible the transference movements that I wish to describe. For instance, it is only in recent years that I have become able to wait and wait for the natural evolution of the transference arising out of the patient's growing trust in the psychoanalytic technique and setting, and to avoid breaking up this natural process by making interpretations. It will be noticed that I am talking about the making of interpretations and not about interpretations as such. It appals me to think how much deep change I have prevented or delayed in patients in a certain classification category by my personal need to interpret. If only we can wait, the patient arrives at understanding creatively and with immense joy, and I now enjoy this joy more than I used to enjoy the sense of having been clever. I think I interpret mainly to let the patient know the limits of my understanding. The principle is that it is the patient and only the patient who has the answers. We may or may not enable him or her to be able to encompass what is known or become aware of it with acceptance.

By contrast with this comes the interpretative work which the analyst must do and which distinguishes analysis from self-analysis. This interpreting by the analyst, if it is to have effect, must be related to the patient's ability to place the analyst outside the area of subjective phenomena. What is then involved is the patient's ability to use the analyst, which is the subject of this paper. In teaching, as in the feeding of a child, the capacity to use objects is taken for granted, but in our work it is necessary for us to be concerned with the development and the establishment of the capacity to use objects and to recognize a patient's inability to use objects, where this is a fact.

It is in the analysis of the borderline type of case that one has the chance to observe the delicate phenomena that give pointers to an understanding of truly schizophrenic states. By the term 'a borderline case' I mean the kind of case in which the core of the patient's disturbance is psychotic, but the patient has enough psychoneurotic organization always to be able to present psychoneurosis or psychosomatic disorder when the central psychotic anxiety threatens to break through in crude form. In such cases the psychoanalyst may collude for years with the patient's need to be psychoneurotic (as opposed to mad) and to be treated as psychoneurotic. The analysis goes well, and everyone is pleased.
The only drawback is that the analysis never ends. It can be terminated, and the patient may even mobilize a psychoneurotic false self for the purpose of finishing and expressing gratitude. But, in fact, the patient knows that there has been no change in the underlying (psycotic) state and that the analyst and the patient have succeeded in colluding to bring about a failure. Even this failure may have value if both analyst and patient acknowledge the failure. The patient is older and the opportunities for death by accident or disease have increased, so that actual suicide may be avoided. Moreover, it has been fun while it lasted. If psychoanalysis could be a way of life, then such a treatment might be said to have done what it was supposed to do. But psychoanalysis is no way of life. We all hope our patients will finish with us and forget us, and that they will find living itself to be the therapy that makes sense. Although we write papers about these borderline cases we are inwardly troubled when the madness that is there remains undiscovered and unmet. I have tried to state this in a broader way in a paper on classification (Winnicott, 1959–64).

It is perhaps necessary to prevaricate a little longer to give my own view on the difference between object-relating and object-usage. In object-relating the subject allows certain alterations in the self to take place, of a kind that has caused us to invent the term cathexis. The object has become meaningful. Projection mechanisms and identifications have been operating, and the subject is depleted to the extent that something of the subject is found in the object, though enriched by feeling. Accompanying these changes is some degree of physical involvement (however slight) towards excitement, in the direction of the functional climax of an orgasm. (In this context I deliberately omit reference to the very important aspect of relating that is an exercise in cross-identifications. This must be omitted here because it belongs to a phase of development that is subsequent to and not prior to the phase of development with which I am concerned in this paper, that is to say, the move from self-containment and relating to subjective objects into the realm of object-usage.) (Winnicott, 1968b.)

Object-relating is an experience of the subject that can be described in terms of the subject as an isolate (Winnicott, 1958). When I speak of the use of an object, however, I take object-relating for granted, and add new features that involve the nature and the behaviour of the object. For instance, the object, if it is to be used, must necessarily be real in the sense of being part of shared reality, not a bundle of projections. It is this, I think, that makes for the world of difference that exists between relating and usage.

If I am right in this, then it follows that discussion of the subject of relating is a much easier exercise for analysts than is the discussion of usage, since relating may be examined as a phenomenon of the subject, and psychoanalysis always likes to be able to eliminate all factors that are environmental, except in so far as the environment can be thought of in terms of projective mechanisms. But in examining usage there is no escape; the analyst must take into account the nature of the object, not as a projection, but as a thing in itself.

For the time being may I leave it at that, that relating can be described in terms of the individual subject, and that usage cannot be described except in terms of acceptance of the object's independent existence, its property of having been there all the time? You will see that it is just these problems that concern us when we look at the area which I have tried to draw attention to in my work on what I have called transitional phenomena.

But this change does not come about automatically, by maturational process alone. It is this detail that I am concerned with.

In clinical terms: two babies are feeding at the breast; one is feeding on the self in the form of projections, and the other is feeding on (using) milk from a woman's breast. Mothers, like analysts, can be good or not good enough; some can and some cannot carry the baby over from relating to usage.

I would like to put in a reminder here that the essential feature in the concept of transitional objects and phenomena (according to my
This thing that there is in between relating and use is the subject's placing of the object outside the area of the subject's omnipotent control, that is, the subject's perception of the object as an external phenomenon, not as a projective entity, in fact recognition of it as an entity in its own right.  

This change (from relating to use) means that the subject destroys the object. From here it could be argued by an armchair philosopher that there is therefore no such thing in practice as the use of an object; if the object be external, then the object is destroyed by the subject. Should the philosopher come out of his chair and sit on the floor with his patient, however, he will find that there is an intermediate position. In other words, he will find that after 'subject relates to object' comes 'subject destroys object' (as it becomes external); and then may come 'object survives' destruction by the subject. But there may or may not be survival. A new feature thus arrives in the theory of object-relating. The subject says to the object: 'I destroyed you', and the object is there to receive the communication. From now on the subject says: 'Hullo object!' 'I destroyed you.' 'I love you.' 'You have value for me because of your survival of my destruction of you.' 'While I am loving you I am all the time destroying you in (unconscious) fantasy.' Here fantasy begins for the individual. The subject can now use the object that has survived. It is important to note that it is not only that the subject destroys the object because the object is placed outside the area of omnipotent control. It is equally significant to state this the other way round and to say that it is the destruction of the object that places the object outside the area of the subject's omnipotent control. In these ways the object develops its own autonomy and life, and (if it survives) contributes in to the subject, according to its own properties.  

In other words, because of the survival of the object, the subject may now have started to live a life in the world of objects, and so the subject stands to gain immeasurably; but the price has to be paid in acceptance of the ongoing destruction in unconscious fantasy relative to object-relating.  

Let me repeat. This is a position that can only be arrived at by the individual in early stages of emotional growth through the actual survival of cathexed objects that are at the time in process of becoming destroyed because real, becoming real because destroyed (being destructible and expendable).  

From now on, this stage having been reached, projective mechanisms assist in the act of noticing what is there, but are not the reason why the object is there. In my opinion this is a departure from orthodox psychoanalytic theory, which tends to think of external reality only in terms of the individual's projective mechanisms.  

I have nearly made my whole statement. Not quite, however, because it is not possible for me to take for granted an acceptance of the fact that the first impulse in the subject's relation to the object (objectively perceived, not subjective) is destructive.  

The central postulate in this thesis is that whereas the subject does not destroy the subjective object (projection material), destruction turns up and becomes a central feature in so far as the object is objectively perceived, has autonomy, and belongs to 'shared' reality. This is the difficult part of my thesis, at least for me.  

It is generally understood that the reality principle involves the individual in anger and reactive destruction, but my thesis is that the destruction plays its part in making the reality, placing the object outside the self. For this to happen, favourable conditions are necessary.  

This is simply a matter of examining the reality principle under high power. As I see it, we are familiar with the change whereby projection mechanisms enable the subject to take cognizance of the object, without projection mechanisms being the reason for the object's existence. At the point of development that is under survey the subject is creating the object in the sense of finding externality itself, and it has to be added that this experience depends on the object's capacity to survive. (It is important that this means 'not retaliate'.) If it is in an analysis that these matters are taking place, then the analyst, the analytic technique, and the analytic setting all come in as surviving or not surviving the patient's destructive attacks. This destructive activity is the patient's attempt to place the analyst outside the area of omnipotent control, that is, out in the world. Without the experience of maximum destructiveness (object not protected) the subject never places the analyst outside and therefore can never do more than experience a kind of self-analysis, using the analyst as a projection of a part of the self. In terms of feeding, the patient, then, can only feed on the self and cannot use the breast for getting fat. The patient may even enjoy the analytic experience but will not fundamentally change.  

And if the analyst is a subjective phenomenon, what about waste-disposal? A further statement is needed in terms of output.

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1 In choosing the title for my Hogarth book I was showing how much I was influenced by Dr Phyllis Greenacre at the Edinburgh Congress. Unfortunately, I failed to put into the book an acknowledgement of this fact.  
2 I was influenced in my understanding of this point by W. Clifford M. Scott (personal communication, c. 1940).
In psychoanalytic practice the positive changes that come about in this area can be profound. They do not depend on interpretative work. They do depend on the analyst's survival of the attacks, which includes the idea of absence of a change to retaliation. These attacks may be very difficult for the analyst to stand, especially when they are expressed in terms of delusion or through manipulation which makes the analyst actually do things that are technically bad. (I refer to such a thing as unreliability at moments when reliability is all that matters, as well as to survival in terms of keeping alive and the absence of the quality of retaliation.)

The analyst feels like interpreting, but this can spoil the process and for the patient can seem like a kind of self-defence, the analyst parrying the patient's attack. Better to wait till after the phase is over, and then discuss with the patient what has been happening. This is surely legitimate, for as analyst one has one's own needs; but verbal interpretation at this point is not the essential feature and brings its own dangers. The essential feature is the analyst's survival and the intactness of the psychoanalytic technique. Imagine how traumatic can be the actual death of the analyst when this kind of work is in process, although even the actual death of the analyst is not as bad as the development in the analyst of a change towards retaliation. These risks simply must be taken by the patient. Usually the analyst lives through these phases of movement in the transference, and after each phase there comes reward in terms of love, reinforced by the fact of the backcloth of unconscious destruction.

It appears to me that the idea of a developmental phase involving survival of object does affect the theory of the roots of aggression. It is no good saying that a baby of a few days old envies the breast. It is legitimate, however, to say that at whatever age a baby begins to allow the breast an external position (outside the area of projection) then this means that destruction of the breast has become a feature. I mean the actual impulse to destroy. It is an important part of what a mother does, to be the first person to take the baby through this first version of the many that will be encountered, of attack that is survived. This is the right moment in the child's development, because of the child's relative feebleness, so that destruction can fairly easily be survived. Even so it is a very tricky matter; it is only too easy for a mother to react moralistically when her baby bites and hurts.3 But this language involving the breast is jargon. The whole area of development and of management is involved in which adaptation is related to dependence, apart, that is, from the important detail of relating to the breast.

It will be seen that, although destruction is the word I am using, this actual destruction belongs to the object's failure to survive. Without this failure, destruction remains potential. The word 'destruction' is needed, not because of the baby's impulse to destroy, but because of the object's liability not to survive.

The way of looking at things that belongs to my presentation of this paper makes possible a new approach to the whole subject of the roots of aggression. For instance, it is not necessary to give inborn aggression more than that which is its due in company with everything else that is inborn. Undoubtedly inborn aggression must be variable in a quantitative sense in the same way that everything else that is inherited is variable as between individuals. The variations in inborn aggression are slight as compared with the total inheritance of that which can lead to aggressiveness. By contrast, the variations are great that arise out of the differences in the experiences of various newborn babies according to whether they are or are not seen through this very difficult phase. Such variations in the field of experience are indeed immense. Moreover, the babies that have been seen through this phase well are likely to be more aggressive clinically than the ones who have not been seen through the phase well, and for whom aggression is not something that can be encompassed (become ego-syntonic), or can be retained only in the form of a liability to be the object of attack.

This involves a rewriting of the theory of the roots of aggression since most of that which has already been written by analysts has been formulated without reference to that which is being discussed in this paper. The assumption is always there, in orthodox theory, that aggression is reactive to the encounter with the reality principle, whereas here it is the destructive drive that creates the quality of externality.

Let me look for a moment at the exact place of this attack and survival in the hierarchy of relationships. More primitive and quite different is annihilation. Annihilation means 'no hope'; cathexis withers up because no result completes the reflex to produce conditioning. Attack in anger relative to the encounter with the reality principle is a more sophisticated concept, postdating the destruction that I postulate here. In the destruction of the object to which I am referring there is no anger. There could be said to be joy at the object's survival. From this moment, or arising out of this phase, the object is in fantasy always being destroyed. This quality of 'always being destroyed' makes the reality of the surviving object felt as such, strengthens the feeling tone, and contributes to object constancy. The object can now be used.

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3 In fact, the baby's development is immensely complicated if he or she should happen to be born with a tooth, so that the gum's attack on the breast can never be tried out.
I wish to conclude with a note on using and usage. By 'use' I do not mean 'exploitation'. As analysts, we know what it is like to be used, which means that we can see the end of the treatment, be it several years away. Many of our patients come with this problem already solved—they can use objects and they can use us and can use analysis, just as they have used their parents and their siblings and their homes. However, there are many patients who need us to be able to give them a capacity to use us. In meeting the needs of such patients, we shall need to know what I am saying here about our survival of their destructiveness. A backcloth of unconscious destruction of the analyst is set up and we survive it or, alternatively, we shall become involved in yet another analysis interminable.

SUMMARY

Object-relating can be described in terms of the experience of the subject. Description of object-usage involves consideration of the nature of the object. I am offering for discussion the reasons why, in my opinion, a capacity to use an object is more sophisticated than a capacity to relate to objects; and relating may be to a subjective object, but usage implies that the object is part of external reality.

This sequence can be observed: (1) Subject relates to object. (2) Object is in process of being found instead of placed by the subject in the world. (3) Subject destroys object. (4) Object survives destruction. (5) Subject can use object.

The object is always being destroyed. This destruction becomes the unconscious backcloth for love of a real object; that is, an object outside the area of the subject's omnipotent control.

Study of this problem involves a statement of the positive value of destructiveness. The destructiveness plus the object's survival of the destruction places the object outside the area in which projective mental mechanisms operate, so that a world of shared reality is created which the subject can use and which can feed back into the subject.

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