Self Psychology after Kohut: One Theory or Many?

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HEINZ KOHUT DIED IN 1981 leaving his last book, How Does Analysis Cure?, to be published posthumously three years later. The sum total of his work included three books and a number of papers, but his influence cannot be measured by how much he wrote. By the time of his death he had developed a unique approach to the theory and technique of psychoanalysis, naming it self psychology, and had established as his central purpose to make of self psychology the superordinate framework for encompassing and understanding the entire psychoanalytic process. However, it was only gradually that Kohut arrived at this position. In 1957, in an address before the Institute for Psychoanalysis in Chicago, he (Kohut, 1959) asserted his belief that empathy and introspection defined and limited the domain of inquiry in the field, a declaration that was to have great importance to the theory he had yet to develop, but that was not understood as such at the time. The unspoken, indirect reference was to his own conviction that psychoanalysis did not have to seek for explanations of clinical phenomena in a biologically based drive psychology, but rather could base its clinical theory on the analytic situation per se. With this relatively modest beginning, Kohut (1966), (1968) went on to publish his discovery of new transference configurations, together with his delineation of how such transferences might be recognized, interpreted, and worked through analytically. He also described the countertransference responses which might be anticipated to these particular transference configurations, noting how the countertransference responses themselves might serve diagnostic functions. All of

these contributions were elaborated more fully in Kohut's first book, The Analysis of the Self(1971), which was greeted by the psychoanalytic world with considerable interest and even enthusiasm, though, of course, there were also some controversial and negative reactions. By describing a new form of character disorder and an appropriate analytic treatment for it, Kohut was for the most part perceived as adding to the scope and effectiveness of the psychoanalytic enterprise. Kohut did not, apparently, intend more himself at the time. It was only in retrospect that he could describe these earlier efforts as "pouring new wine into old bottles" (1984, p. 114) in order to render his contributions more acceptable both to his colleagues and to himself. But with the publication on the paper on narcissistic rage (Kohut, 1972) wherein destructive aggression, rather than being seen as an innate drive, is conceptualized as reactive to frustration, Kohut's ideas seemed to veer away from the generally accepted psychoanalytic canon, so that in the years that intervened between the publication of Kohut's first book and his second volume, The Restoration of the Self(1977), significant changes had already taken place in Kohut's thinking, making for an extremely critical reception to the ideas that the latter book put forward. Most challenging to psychoanalysis was Kohut's proposition that the self, in the broad sense, should be viewed as the superordinate framework for understanding all pathology, reserving for the self, in the narrow sense, as portrayed in the tripartite model, a secondary, though complementary, position. This conception placed oedipal pathology and unconscious conflict also in a secondary position as related to pathogenesis. Narcissistic transferences were now called selfobject transferences, and self pathology was expanded to encompass much more than the narcissistic disorders. To some critics it seemed as if Kohut himself had narcissistically expanded in his attempt to engulf all of analysis; in any case, Kohut's own goals had certainly enlarged. The psychology of the self became a focal center of attraction for many analysts, with Kohut's self psychology gaining numbers of loyal adherents to balance the numbers of skeptical detractors who inevitably perceived Kohut as going off in the wrong direction. In his last book, published posthumously as we have already stated, Kohut mainly consolidated his new vision of psychoanalysis, clarifying his
views by responding to questions and concerns addressed to him by critics, and leaving open to the end some pathways to integrating his ideas with mainstream analysis.

What we would like to consider in this essay is self psychology after Kohut. During his lifetime, the leading edge of self-psychological thinking was dominated by its founder. While some of his adherents had published significantly while he was alive, Kohut clearly shaped the advances in self psychology until his death. Since then, however, a number of books have appeared that, while dedicated to his vision, are not limited by it. Indeed, the views of self psychology do diverge, not just from Kohut's views, but from one another as well, leading us to consider, in a paraphrase of Wallerstein (1983)—one self psychology or many?

We can identify six basic attributes either originated by Kohut or significantly emphasized and expanded by him that can be seen to define the psychology of the self. Three of them were named by Stolorow et al. (1987) as Kohut's major contributions to the science of psychoanalysis. They are: the unwavering application of the empathic-introspective mode as defining and limiting the domain of inquiry; the primacy of self experience; and the concepts of the lifelong need for selfobject function and the varieties of selfobject transference. We would add to this list the emphasis on attachment as the central motivation for the self, in the broad sense, in its effort to establish and maintain self-cohesiveness; the concept of aggression as reactive to frustration; and the emphasis on the psychoanalytic process as carrying with it, along with insight, a significant developmental power and thrust. In order to assess the current self-psychological scene, it seems important to consider the extent to which, and the ways in which, the authors we have selected for review hold to these attributes which we consider foundational to Kohut's self psychology.

**Empathy**

Stolorow, Brandchaft, and Atwood declare, in specific agreement with Kohut, that anything not in principle accessible to empathy and introspection is not within the bounds of psychoanalytic inquiry. Their intersubjective approach is a natural and consistent application of this position, leading them to their theoretical conclusion. Psychoanalysis, they write, is the science of the intersubjective, focused on the interplay between the two differently organized subjective worlds of patient and analyst. Because the observational stance adopted by these authors remains consistently and persistently within, rather than outside, what is designated as the intersubjective field, the centrality of introspection and empathy is guaranteed; that is, extratransference, extrarelational information becomes peripheral, even irrelevant, to the analysis. Moreover, the use of this perspective is intended to focus in high power and concentrate exclusively both analyst and patient on the effects of their mutual interaction, and the authors are convinced that the analyst is thereby enabled to influence the patient's self organization in a decisive manner. This mutative influence is based on the authors' conviction that experience and interpretation within the transference are the essential agents for psychoanalytic cure. Further, pathology itself becomes understood as a kind of two-person event, function of both patient and analyst. Patients do come into treatment with specific selfobject needs and specific self pathology, these authors state, but how these needs are met and responded to in the intersubjective psychoanalytic field can significantly influence the severity of this pathology as well as the course and outcome of treatment. In a real way for these authors, then, every diagnosis and every course of treatment can only be comprehended in the field comprised of the two individual subjectivities in interaction with one another, joined together by an exclusive intersubjective empathic-introspective stance.

Wolf (1988), too, strongly identifies with Kohut's commitment to an exclusive focus on the empathic-introspective stance, limiting himself to this perspective in the clinical situation, rather than depending on other sources from outside the dyad for inspiration or direction. Wolf's delineation of two additional selfobject transferences, the adversarial selfobject transference and the efficacy selfobject transference (to be discussed below), which expand the number that Kohut had discovered during his own lifetime, was forged within the crucible of the analytic situation.

While Wolf, and Stolorow and his colleagues follow Kohut's delimitation, all the other authors to be considered here do not. While the latter, for the most part, adhere to the importance of empathy in clinical work, each in his own way expands on empathy in the direction of developing theory and practice generously inspired by other related fields.

Basch, for example, asserting strongly that he would use no reconstructive supposition or theoretical assumption not validated scientifically and extra-analytically in infant research, sets out to elucidate a unifying explanatory theory for analysis based not just on empathy and introspection, but also on infant observation, on research in perceptual, cognitive, and affective psychology, on neurobiology and scientific philosophy, as well as on cybernetics, systems theory, and
information theory, which he combines to create a superordinate theory encompassing, Basch avers, all that is important for human development. While he holds empathy in the highest regard, even devising a scheme for teaching a capacity for empathy to the inexperienced therapist, he also constructs from outside the clinical situation several major conceptualizations including a complex developmental spiral, a negative feedback cycle on which a model for thought process is based, and a developmental line leading from affect to emotion. These scientifically based formulations become the foundation for an integrated wide-ranging, self-psychological therapeutic approach.

Goldberg also takes a strong position regarding the place of empathy and introspection in defining the field of psychoanalysis and self psychology; he asserts that empathy and introspection alone cannot define the field. In A Fresh Look at Psychoanalysis (1988), he makes the point that one cannot have anything other than a naïve empathic or introspective capacity without theory, and that the theory cannot be deduced de novo from the psychoanalytic situation, but, as in any science, is brought to it in the form of intuition, hunch, and inference. His thesis in this book, buttressed by an extensive review of the relevant philosophy of science literature, is that theory always precedes observation. Without it, one would have little or no way of knowing or selecting what among the myriad of data before us is worth attending to. Moreover, without theory each patient would appear to the analyst as unique, and the profession would not only be more art than science, but it would also lack the essential generalities that can and must be taught and learned by future analysts. New ideas should be sought, and the unpacking of our more global formulations should be undertaken, Goldberg writes, but this exercise should not be confused with the ordinary practice of psychoanalysis. New formulations are generated out of postanalytic and extra-analytic, as well as analytic, reflections regarding the course of treatment. The new formulations are then brought back into the consulting room. It is in this way that we inform and improve our capacity to be empathic with our patients. In a nutshell, empathic understanding cannot be generated exclusively from within in the here-and-now analytic situation. In his later book, The Prisonhouse of Psychoanalysis (1990), Goldberg draws even more heavily on ancillary but related fields to elucidate his points concerning the empathic basis for self-other connectedness, in particular from the philosophic writings of Heidegger (1962), Rorty (1989), and Habermas (1988), and from recent neurophysiological findings regarding the brain's processing of memory and representation. Goldberg asserts, in contrast to Basch, and, as well shall see, in contrast also to Lichtenberg, that we should not depend on other sciences for greater truth than can be derived from the psychoanalytic situation itself. Specifically, he questions the value of infant research as providing a more accurate picture of early infant and childhood development than is offered by our own psychoanalytic reconstructions. With some inconsistency, however, Goldberg does express great confidence in the relevance of philosophy and neurophysiology to provide a basis for more accurate understanding of the clinical situation, particularly for conceptualizing the other as integral to self function and organization, and for understanding the inevitable empathic disruptions that ensue in the psychoanalytic situation. Goldberg concludes that one can never limit psychoanalysis to empathy, despite what Kohut says about its defining the field.

Lichtenberg (1989) states that he views empathy as a mode of perception characterizing the optimal state of attentiveness and listening, consistent with Kohut's position. However, unlike Kohut, he asserts that the analyst must gain information from many other sources, both from within the analytic situation and from outside it. Analysts draw on their own experience, emotions, and fantasies, and on the particulars of the patient's developmental history, as well as on extra-analytic information about the real life of the patient. Most particularly, Lichtenberg uses infant and child observational research and experience, confirmed by neurobiological studies, in order to construct what he has termed "model scenes," that is, prototypical episodes to describe experiences of major significance in the early childhood of the individual, for example, the oedipal drama, separation anxieties, rapprochement crises, attachment, loss, and events of more idiosyncratic importance in the life of the patient. Lichtenberg argues that a deep knowledge of infant and childhood development improves the capacity of the analyst to supply reconstructions based on accurately depicted scenes from early life, and improves thereby his or her empathic capacity to understand and interpret what is meaningful in the person's history; it is on such accurate interpretations that empathy is most solidly based.

Bacal and Newman (1990), while clearly honoring Kohut's emphasis on empathy as the best stance for data gathering in the psychoanalytic situation, have written a book whose thesis is that self psychology as a theory and practice is greatly enhanced by being amended and expanded through object-relations perspectives. These authors, by researching and then elucidating the connections between self psychology and these theories, which have not only predated Kohut's insights, but may even have preempted them, have fulfilled a long-felt need in self psychology, and, in fact, in all of analysis. Not only do they supply historical antecedents either unknown or unacknowledged by Kohut, but
they also identify concepts from those object-relations theories they survey that in their view can be usefully integrated into an expanded self-psychological model. So, while other self

psychologists have turned to related but external scientific fields to go beyond the self-imposed limitation that Kohut advanced as his credo, Bacal and Newman have turned to other, related psychoanalytic contributors for such expansion and improvement of clinical theory.

Finally, Gedo. We turn to Gedo last because of all those we have selected to include in this review of self psychology after Kohut, Gedo is the least identified, either by himself or by his colleagues, as a self psychologist. In fact, he has specifically announced that he is not a self psychologist, and, of all of those who had at the beginning been close collaborators, is currently the most outspoken critic of Kohut's ideas. Nevertheless Gedo has acknowledged his debt to Kohut, and has continued to use many of Kohut's insights into what Gedo designates as the archaic transferences. And it is particularly in the area of empathy that Gedo has announced his greatest disagreements with Kohut's self psychology. Fairly or unfairly, Gedo criticizes Kohut for conceptualizing empathy as a method of cure, covertly using it in the clinical situation in that way. With a mixture of humor and satire, Gedo pictures Kohut as pouring empathy as a healing balm over psychic wounds, a kind of mystic solution to problems that should be handled interpretively. (In fact, it may well be that Kohut was directing to Gedo his chapter in How Does Analysis Cure? which is aimed at correcting misunderstandings about the use of empathy in self psychology. Here Kohut explicitly states his belief that empathy is not curative.) Clearly, then, Gedo does not conceptualize the empathic-introspective mode as defining and limiting the domain of inquiry in psychoanalysis. In fact, Gedo notes that analysts cannot help but use observations from other past and current patients in their efforts to understand a given individual, and he asserts that he uses many models of the mind, from Freud on, in the clinical situation.

Self Experience

The second attribute we have identified as foundational to Kohut's self psychology is that of the primacy of self experience. All of these authors make of the self the central focus of clinical consideration, thereby either replacing instinctual drive and the tripartite structural model altogether, or, as in the case of Gedo, and, especially, Basch, limiting its applicability. Each of these authors, however, puts forward a different conception of the self.

Stolorow et al. (1987) criticize Kohut's model of the bipolar self as carrying the potential for reification of self experience, for mechanistic thinking, and for limiting the number of possible selfobject transferences available for discovery in the analytic situation (the danger being, presumably, that the model itself would be taken too concretely). They establish instead not a model of the self, but a description of the self as an organization of experience, conceptualized in terms of invariant principles of organization. It is these invariant principles of organization, structuralized from childhood, that determine and delimit the individual's subjective experience.

Basch, too, replaces both the tripartite model and the bipolar self with his own functional self system, a part of the brain (equated in Basch's conception with the mind) which integrates the affective and cognitive information processing activities governing the individual's adaptation to the environment. The self system is fully functional only after the individual has attained the capacity for symbolic thought, free will, and the ability to control affects. In its healthy form, it is an open system capable of creativity, free will, adaptation, and learning from experience, in contrast to the pathological, closed system wherein unconscious patterns of expectation render the individual unable to adapt to new circumstances, to generate new information, and therefore unable to change inappropriate unconscious patterns. Competence and adequate self-esteem, the cardinal signs of a well-functioning and well-developing self system, are reduced in the closed system, resulting in anxiety, depression, and self pathology.

Goldberg's model of the self is purely psychological, although it is bolstered in The Prisonhouse by neurophysiological correlates, and appears to be consistent with Kohut's bipolar self without that model's inelgant metaphor of the tension arc, and without its potential for reified poles and segments. In A Fresh Look, Goldberg describes the self as a structure composed of form on the one hand, and of a particular content on the other. Pathology that is primary relates to the forms or patterns of the self, whereas pathology that is secondary relates to its content and meanings. In effect, Goldberg asserts that psychoanalysis before self psychology had been too preoccupied with secondary pathology, that is, too concerned with the contents or meanings generated by the self structure. In contrast, Goldberg argues, it is the form or pattern that merits our attention, the form being the essence of self structure.

Wolf, in particular, remains within the outline or structure Kohut had set down, even to the extent of preferring the same looseness of definition of the self and other concepts that Kohut had used. Wolf, after all, had written a key paper
with Kohut (**Kohut and Wolf, 1978**) and writes in his Preface that he has accepted the main body of principles, hypotheses, and definitions advocated by Kohut.

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Because, as he himself states, Lichtenberg's focus is on continuities in each of his five motivational systems, he does not articulate a particular model of the self, or, for that matter, of the mind. Rather, he draws on Stern's (**1985**) stages of development of the self and, as with the others, maintains the self experience as at the center of his considerations.

Gedo's model of the self is defined as a hierarchy of motives and values, accounting for both motivation and superego functioning. Five possible modes of functioning are described, from the most archaic, Mode 1, to the most mature, Mode 5, with developmental progression and regression possible. Each mode is based on a particular model of the mind, which includes, at the lowest level, the tension arc model of Freud (**1900**); moving to the symbiosis/separation-individuation model of Mahler (**Mahler et al., 1975**); then to the self model of Kohut (**1977**), with its idealization/optimal disillusionment/deidealization; to the tripartite model of Freud (**1923**) with its potential for intrapsychic conflict; to, finally, the progressive neutralization model of Kohut and Seitz (**1963**). In each mode Gedo depicts the developmental achievements that characterize it, the typical phase-appropriate dangers and defenses the mode involves, and, added in *The Mind in Disorder* (**1988**), a depth dimension with depicts both the achievement of secondary autonomy and the reverse, that is, the loss of autonomous functions of the self once these functions have become involved in conflict. It is clear, then, that while Gedo places the self at the center of experience, and uses Kohut's self-psychological model of the self, albeit in a limited way, he adds other models of the mind, or self, including a psychological model put forward earlier (before self psychology was devised) by Kohut, in co-authorship with Seitz, as well as Mahler's model, and, of course, Freud's.

Finally, we come to Bacal and Newman, whose central point in their book is specifically related to their argument with Kohut. First, they contend that self psychology is in reality an object-relations theory—that what is implicit, not openly acknowledged, in object-relations theory is the self, and what is implicit, not openly acknowledged, in self psychology is a particular type of object relationship. Unlike Kohut, then, whose focus is on the self alone as being at the center of self psychology, these authors insist that it is the self and its object that should occupy the center. By concentrating on selfobject functions and on the importance of subjective experience, these authors assert, Kohut had inadvertently lost sight of the object that provides

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that function. This stance, they contend, would seem to risk the clinician's blurring the important distinction between the actual characteristics of the external object and the individual's intrapsychic experience of that object. Bacal and Newman's contention is stated succinctly; the selfobject is best understood as the self's object. Theirs is a unique position in self psychology, then, because the vital differentiation between object and selfobject, so central to the organization of Kohut's view of self psychology, seems to be lost or, at the least, fogged over. Goldberg, in *The Prisonhouse*, for example, takes a clearly opposite view of the self/object dichotomy. He sees the self as composed of its relationships with others—composed, that is, of its selfobjects. In his view, selfobjects are not, like objects, separate and distinct beings, and so discretely represented in the mind. Selfobjects are not even experiences as such; rather, they are the others that allow one to achieve and maintain an individual entity. Selfobjects are the very composition of the self.

In addition to their thesis that self psychology would be enhanced by focusing not just on the self, but equally on the object that supplies selfobject functions, Bacal and Newman also bring forth central ideas of the major object-relations theorists which would, in their view, delineate more clearly certain aspects of the self. For example, while Kohut described vertical and horizontal splitting, he did not, according to these authors, describe the nature of the internal disruption that results from such splitting, and especially he did not describe the structural condition of the self following upon traumatic experience, except in the broadest of terms. In contrast, the focus of object-relations theory is within the self that has suffered the damage. Fairbairn (**1952**) and then Guntrip (**1971**) introduce the concept of a self responding to severe trauma induced by pathological object relations, creating a self that is not just fragmented, but a self that defends itself by schizoid suicide, that wishes to die and to then be reborn. Bacal and Newman's point is that by attaining a more specific understanding of the self derived from object-relations theory, better and more effective interventions might be made following traumatic experience in the transference—that the patient's fear is not just retraumatization, but, worse, internal self-disruption.

The other authors under consideration here, with the exception of Gedo who does not use the concept at all, retain the purity of Kohut's selfobject definition, some of them avoiding the concept of object altogether (Goldberg, Lichtenberg, and Wolf) and some making the same distinction Kohut makes between selfobject and object, retaining both concepts in their theoretical considerations (Basch and
Stolorow et al.). In this context Basch stands alone among those who use the selfobject concept in viewing the requirement for selfobject function as indicative of an endangered or fragmented self; the others conceive of the need for a selfobject relationship as part of normal self functioning. Stolorow, Brandchaft, and Atwood, in conjunction with Daphne Stolorow, also stand out from the others in their expansion and refinement of the selfobject concept, contending that selfobject functions pertain to the integration of affect into the organization of self experience, with the requirement for selfobject ties relating to the need for attuned responsiveness to affect states in all stages of life.

The Selfobject Transferences

Turning to the organization of selfobject transferences, each has established a model that encompasses the full range of extant analytic transferences, with the possible exception of Wolf, who focuses primarily on the selfobject relationships. Stolorow et al. present two conceptions of transference. One model defines transference as all the ways in which the patient's experience of the analytic relationship is shaped by his own psychological structures. The selfobject transference is not a type of transference, but a dimension of all transference, fluctuating as figure-ground. Even when self restoration and maintenance are not central, giving way to other facets such as loving, hating, desiring, or competing, the selfobject dimension operates silently in the background. The second model of transference offered in the same book extends the first with a bipolar metaphor. One pole, the selfobject pole, represents the development-enhancing experience of a selfobject relationship supplying missing self functions; the other pole represents conflictual relationships that express resistance to previous trauma and fear of its repetition. The analysis shifts back and forth from one pole to the other. Stolorow, Brandchaft, and Atwood's framework would seem to be the one among the authors we have cited, save, of course, Gedo, most inclusive and balanced in terms of the majority of familiar transference potentialities, and, therefore, the most potentially integrable within the mainstream. It is true, however, that the two models of transference included present different emphases, and that the clinical examples of transference provided are heavily weighted in the direction of self pathology and attachment motivation, perhaps because these case illustrations best adumbrate their own particular intersubjective frame of reference.

We note in this regard that Bacal and Newman, dedicated as they are to integrating self psychology with object-relations theory, point out the highly significant role they feel Stolorow and his colleagues have played in addressing gaps in self-psychological theory. Bacal and Newman contend that intersubjectivity in general constitutes a bridge between self psychology and object-relations theory. While Bacal and Newman, for the most part, conceptualize transference in selfobject terms, they, in their own idiosyncratic fashion, treat the selfobject as if it were an object, and the self as if it had certain qualities attributed to this structure by Fairbairn (1952), Klein (1952), Winnicott (1965), and others in the English school. Intersubjectivity can be seen to fit Bacal and Newman's view of transference, then, as in intersubjectivity, transference is conceptualized as an interplay between the two distinct and differently organized subjectivities, which Bacal and Newman may translate in their own way as the self and self's object. That English object-relations concepts can play an important role in the theory construction of these authors, particularly their theory of transference, can be exemplified by the way in which Bacal and Newman use Klein to devise a new selfobject transference. They note that, in contrast to Kohut who emphasized the importance of the child's actual experience of an object insofar as it fulfills selfobject functions, Klein had emphasized the child's unconscious fantasies about an object. Bacal and Newman contend that the role of unconscious fantasy, underplayed in self psychology in both theory and practice, must be considered. They support their contention that fantasy can and does have a role in infant mental life by their own (again, rather idiosyncratic) reading of Stern (1985) to the effect that the infant's early cognitive capacities are much more sophisticated than had been previously realized, except by Klein and her followers, inferring that fantasy formation may be possible very early in the infant's life, a position Stern, to our reading, clearly did not hold. The authors argue that Kohut's selfobject and Klein's internal object are comparable concepts insofar as both are integral representations of the outside world which have had a profound effect on the individual's self. The difference, they hold, is that Klein's object is the internal experience of the external object determined by vicissitudes of unconscious instinctual fantasy, whereas Kohut's selfobject is the lived experience of that internal object not amended by fantasy. Whether it is internal or external, and the extent to which it is determined by the self and not by the environment, is not addressed in self psychology, because such considerations would require utilizing the concept of distortion of perception, a concept also ignored by Kohut (though not ignored, to our reading, by Basch, Gedo, Goldberg, and Lichtenberg), in favor
of accepting completely the validity of the individual's subjective reality. The authors conclude that Klein's unconscious fantasy could add a dimension to the usual understanding of the selfobject experience, the fantasy either detracting from or augmenting this experience. They contend one's perception of the selfobject is always influenced by unconscious fantasy generated by the self. Self psychology would benefit from this addition of fantasy-influencing perception, which addition would emphasize the predominance of the intrapsychic component in selfobject experience both developmentally and in analysis. Moreover, a fantasy selfobject could replace a lack of actual good selfobject relations. Thus, while Kohut postulated that in the lifetime of anyone capable of being analyzed at all, some positive selfobject functions must have been provided, these authors envision a fantasy selfobject that can make up for having had no good object at all, or where the selfobject representation is only minimally influenced by the actual caretakers. They contend that a transference based on a fantasy selfobject experience rather than on any substantive selfobject experience from the past, would be especially prone to disruption in the treatment situation, which could account for the particular vulnerability that some patients have to selfobject failure. Bacal and Newman's position is a clear departure from the traditional view of the selfobject transference, as well as of the self. While they view Stolorow and his colleagues as compatible with their position, that compatibility is quite limited, and, as will be seen, Basch, Goldberg, Lichtenberg, and Wolf have very different models of the transference.

Basch presents a three-dimensional, hierarchical grid model of the transference. One axis represents the four categories of patient he recognizes, not exemplified by symptom but by level of affect development and integration. The first category includes patients who experienced failure of affective bonding during infancy, lacking, therefore, the capacity for self regulation, or basic tension control—the borderline. The second includes patients who through experience are shame-prone, lacking the capacity to put affects into words, and who, therefore, never progress from affect to emotion—the depressed and hypochondriacal. The third category includes patients who did not get sufficient affect attunement and who, therefore, learned that their true emotional states could never be affirmed—the narcissistic personality disorder. The fourth category includes patients with adequate self development, but who experienced oedipal trauma. Basch demonstrates specific modifications in therapeutic approach for each of these categories. The second axis of Basch's transference model concerns the form of selfobject relationship, whether mirroring, idealizing, or alter ego. The third axis involves the content of the transference, which may include psychosexual issues, or concerns regarding anatomy, creativity, or attachment needs. Basch is distinguished from the other authors included here by viewing the nature of the transference relationship established by the patient as specifically related to the nature of the developmental trauma experienced by the patient. This is not put in terms of diagnosis so much, though diagnosis may be included, but rather in terms of the way in which affect had been experienced and integrated within the self.

Goldberg's model of transference comprises three levels of transference experience. While patients may be more likely to relate to the analyst on one or another level, all levels are usually experienced within a given analysis, and are therefore conceptualized by Goldberg as aspects of the transference rather than as discrete transference categories. The first level is a contentless, tension-regulating level experienced by patients who require pacification, similar to the original model Goldberg put forward with Gedo (Gedo and Goldberg, 1973). These patients, whose current concerns are related to underlying elements in their self structure, experience dissolution of the stable transference relationship when the ordinary analytic routine is broken, indicating a phase in the analysis when the patient is narcissistically very vulnerable. But again, the level of transference is not meant to be diagnostic; no patient, according to Goldberg, is totally immune from this transference proclivity. Level two consists of Kohut's three selfobject transferences, serving to regulate and maintain self-esteem, providing for the patient the experience of being understood. Level three concerns the contents of the more familiar transferences connected with object representations and conflict, though even at this level conflict is minimized, often resolvable, according to Goldberg, by reordering and strengthening the intactness of the self. In fact, the contents and meanings which appear on this level, related to the patient's life narrative, are considered as merely epiphenomena, rather than as directly related to the formation or dissolution of psychopathology. We can see here most clearly Kohut's vision of the superordinate self, and while the vision may seem extreme, it can be understood in an integrated way when one conceptualizes the self (or the psyche taken as a whole) as retaining superego and ego functions, so that the strengthening and maturation of the ego and superego lead inevitably to less pathological outcomes of all conflict, and here again the exact nature of that conflict, the contents in Goldberg's terms, might well be secondary. The distinction here is that the self'

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psychologist does not conceptualize strengthening of the self as deriving from resolution of conflict, but the other way around. A more integrative view might be that of a circularity, where the strengthening of the self potentiates the
diminution of the psychological importance and meaning of internal conflict, and the resolution of conflict functions to strengthen the self by increasing the power, flexibility, and hegemony of the self (the executive functions of the ego).

Lichtenberg, because his focus is on the five motivational systems he delineates (which will be discussed below), does not elaborate on particular transference constellations, except to note the importance to psychoanalysis of the transference concept in general, and the particular transferences discovered by Freud, and then Kohut. He notes as well that additional transferences are connected to each of the five motivational systems. For example, he recognizes an affiliative transference that derives from his attachment-affiliation motivational system.

Wolf's work, as we indicated above, is closely linked to Kohut's conceptualizations, and, in the tradition of Kohut, has used the clinical situation to discern two additional selfobject transferences, beyond the three that Kohut recognized. He first conceptualized the adversarial selfobject transference, which functions to provide an experience with a benignly opposing force that continues to be supportive and responsive, while at the same time allowing, or even encouraging, active opposition, thus confirming for the self a partial autonomy. In *Treating the Self*, Wolf adds another variety of selfobject transference, the efficacy selfobject transference, providing an experience of having an effective impact on the other, thereby revealing a capacity to evoke from the other necessary selfobject experiences. While Wolf says that the efficacy selfobject transference is a variety of mirroring experience, it is, nevertheless, in his view, best conceptualized as a separate and distinct selfobject type because of the overriding importance of the inborn motivational trend to learn and to do.

Turning to Gedo, he, for the most part, uses classical transferences to conceptualize relationships with the patient which require interpretation. In addition, he conceptualizes transference relationships with the analyst, understood by many as narcissistic and which Gedo himself refers to as "archaic," as not always interpretable, as being "beyond" interpretation. By this Gedo means that the archaic transference can function mainly to serve pacification and unification purposes, and, as such, is not available for insight. This understanding of the developmental function of the archaic transference is reminiscent of Kohut's initial description of the transferences he had discovered and termed "transference-like," invoking a developmental valence to explain their purpose. In *Advances in Clinical Psychoanalysis*, Gedo (1981) describes three approaches to these archaic transference constellations, namely those of Kernberg, Mahler, and Kohut. He concludes that these approaches are not mutually exclusive and that, while in any clinical instance only one of the three approaches is most valid, none of them is sufficient to deal with the universe of clinical experience. Yet, while Gedo does not always choose to use Kohut's clinical approach above the other two, he does accord Kohut the vanguard position of being the one person to advance psychoanalysis past Hartmann's (1964) innovations, and Hartmann is viewed by him as the one person who had advanced psychoanalysis significantly past Freud. Gedo's principal argument with Kohut concerns his view that Kohut had attempted to construct a separate psychoanalytic paradigm, rather than to integrate his work into the main body of analysis.

**Developmental Aspects**

Gedo perceives the archaic transference as not being restricted to the narcissistic disorders, but as being potentially a part of every analysis, as, presently, most self psychologists do, also. These transferences can be and, ideally, should be handled interpretively, but Gedo clearly acknowledges that the interpretive mode is not always possible. Their outstanding characteristic is grandiosity, along with an insistent demand for affirmation of the patient's exceptional worth, for delighted acceptance of his or her exhibitionism, and for self-abnegating renunciation of any acknowledgment of the patient's actual dependence on the analyst, a "triad of vanity, exhibitionism, and arrogant ingratitude." Gedo, siding with Kernberg (1975) and Mahler et al. (1975), views this triad as mainly pathological, but apparently at times sides with Kohut in viewing these attitudes as an aspect of normal development to be welcomed in the transference as offering the opportunity for a developmental progression, for reliving, for working through, and for attaining thereby the resumption of normal development.

As a matter of fact, this aspect of the selfobject transference as promoting a resumption of normal development, and of the psychoanalytical process itself as carrying with it, along with insight, a significant developmental power and thrust, evokes consistent agreement among all of these contributors to self psychology. While this attitude did not originate with Kohut, it was strongly emphasized by him and continues to be emphasized by all who have followed him.
Attachment and Motivation

Turning to the reliance in Kohut's self psychology on attachment as the central motivation of the self for the establishment and maintenance of self cohesiveness, replacing the dual drives of classical analysis as primary, this position has been for the most part retained in the writings of Basch, Goldberg, and Wolf. Basch recognizes a different motivating principle. Bridging the conceptual gap between mind and brain by equating the brain's ordering activity with the subjective sense of competence, Basch holds that the brain's main function, creating order, is experienced by the person psychologically as competence; competence, then, and the attendant achievement of self esteem, become the chief motivational force throughout the individual's lifetime.

Gedo, consistent with his overall integrative stance, retains both the dual drives of classical analysis and the attachment motivation of self psychology, using them, as he says, as each seems appropriate for the patient at any particular point in the patient's analysis.

But the author who has contributed the most in the area of motivation is Lichtenberg, whose Psychoanalysis and Motivation offers a reconceptualization and modification of psychoanalytic theory that effectively preserves the insights of classical analysis while bringing these insights into the wider scientific world of infant and child observers, ethologists, and neurophysiologists, as well as a significant number of psychoanalysts. This work is meant to advance not only self psychology's understanding of motivation, but that of psychoanalysis in general, offering as it does a theory of motivation that, even if one does not accept it in its entirety, can at least serve as a starting point for consideration and integration. He identifies five distinct motivational systems which are intended to encompass the whole of conscious and unconscious motivation. Briefly, they are: the psychological concomitants of the regulation of physiological integration. He assesses by current findings from infant and toddler research. The work is inclusive in that he incorporates Freud's (1920) dual drives of libido and aggression, minus the innate destructive-aggressive drive aspect; Anna Freud's (1936) defensiveaversive system; Kohut's self-selfobject attachment theory; Bowlby's (1969), (1980) attachment theory; Piaget and Inhelder's (1969) cognitive theory; Hendrick's (1942), (1943), White's (1959), and Basch's mastery and effectance motivational theories; Parens' (1979) and Stechler's (1987) reformulated theories of aggression; along with a host of contributions by others.

Much of what Lichtenberg offers is familiar and acceptable to most psychoanalysts, though some aspects of his reformulation are undoubtedly controversial. First, he recognizes all categories of motivation as being on par with all the others, with no one preempting and/or preoccupying either the life cycle in general or a particular phase or stage of life. In addition, he argues that, especially after a child has acquired a capacity for symbolic thought, each of these motivational systems is as likely as all of the others to, at one time or another, be defended against, sequestered, avoided, distorted, fantasied about, and involved in unconscious conflict, and that some of this may take place even during the presymbolic period. Many analysts would certainly question much of this, and in particular deny the equal status of these five systems relative to one another, asserting that the other systems, while present, exist on a level only secondary to the prime movers, libido and aggression.

Aggression as Reactive to Frustration

Destructive aggression as reactive to frustration, rather than as a drive coequal with libido, with equal pleasure attendant upon its discharge represents the final foundational attitude inherent in Kohut's contributions. All of the authors under examination here, with the possible exception of Gedo, accept this central postulate. Lichtenberg's revised view of aggression expresses this self-psychological position most clearly and completely. Based on infant and toddler experimental data, what is classically conceptualized as the aggressive drive is encompassed in his work by two distinct motivational systems. The assertive phenomena attributed to the aggressive drive is contained in Lichtenberg's exploratory assertive motivational system, wherein the focus is on the innate and forceful urge for competence and effectance pleasure present in the individual from birth onward. The destructive (and rageful) phenomena attributed to the aggressive drive is subsumed under the aversive motivational system. Aversion here is understood to encompass fight as well as flight, with the aggressive fight response conceptualized as reactive to frustration or fear rather than being postulated as an innately pleasurable, inevitable, murderous push from within. Lichtenberg argues (though perhaps not convincingly) that aversion is a basic need on par with all the others, not just, as in classical analysis, a defensive or flight reaction to perceived situations of danger.
Conclusion

Having reviewed these authors in terms of their adherence to, deviation from, and furthering of, Kohut's self psychology, at least as they treat the basic attributes we have identified as foundational, we turn briefly, once again, to the question of the extent to which these contributors and their contributions can be integrated into mainstream analysis. We say "once again," because throughout this essay we have considered the potential for integration. To review briefly, Gedo has already accomplished this task primarily by modifying the aspect of self psychology he has embraced in his own overall theoretical perspective. Bacal and Newman have dedicated their efforts to bridging the gap between self psychology and object-relations theories, with the assumption that self psychology is in essence an object-relations theory at its core. Basch, Goldberg, Wolf, and Stolorow and his colleagues, all offer an encompassing view that would incorporate, more or less, the mainstream, but, consistent with Kohut, would require that their particular views of the self be superordinate. And with Lichtenberg there is also a commitment to, on the one hand, self psychology, and, on the other, an integration of mainstream ideas, but his emphasis is on the tendency of both theories to be reductionistic when it comes to motivation. This is most clearly seen in his treatment of the sensual-sexual motivational system, where he states that self psychology has erred in relegating sexuality to a secondary position in motivation, and classical analysis has erred in elevating it to a nearly ubiquitous position; moreover, both theories have underestimated the motivational role of nonsexual sensuality in and of itself, classical analysis conflating it with sexuality, and self psychology limiting it to its self-cohesion-promoting potential.

As for the question we raise—one self psychology or many?—it is clear that the authors we have discussed are original contributors, dedicated to their own unique perspectives, less interested in sounding like one another, or Kohut, than in clearly defining and putting forth their own views. As the situation stands today, we would have to conclude that there are many self psychologies, not just one, reflecting not only the state of psychoanalysis in general, but also the

vigor and ferment that constitutes health in any growing and changing science.

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